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Our area of interest is the relationship between Private Equity professionals and the CEOs of companies. 
Building on previous research on board-CEO relationship and on venture capital and management buyout 
governance, we aim at complementing the frequently used  agency theory perspective by way of a social and 
behavioural perspective.  
 
Whereas agency theorists underline the role of independence between management and board, we think the 
success of private equity professionals lies in their ability to combine independence and control with trust, 
cooperation and support in their relationship with CEOs. 
 
The existence of social ties between VCs and CEOs is expected to produce antagonistic consequences, fostering 
cooperation and support but hampering control. We propose an original model formalising the relations between 
VC-CEO social ties, board processes, VC’s roles vis à vis CEOs, and investment performance. 
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Nous basant sur les travaux concernant la relation entre dirigeants et membres du conseil d’administration, et  les 
modes de gouvernance des capital investisseurs, nous proposons de compléter la perspective de la théorie de 
l’agence par une perspective théorique de nature sociale et comportementale. 
 
Alors que la théorie de l’agence souligne quasi-exclusivement l’importance de l’indépendance entre 
administrateurs et dirigeants, nous pensons que les capital investisseurs sont capables de concilier indépendance 
et confiance, coopération, support vis à vis des dirigeants. 
 
Selon la perspective théorique choisie, l’existence de liens sociaux entre capital investisseurs et dirigeants peut 
produire des effets contradictoires, favorisant la coopération mais défavorisant le contrôle. Nous proposons un 
modèle visant à formaliser les relations entre (1) les liens sociaux entre capital investisseurs et dirigeants, (2) les 
processus et les rôles qui caractérisent leur relation,  et (3) la performance des investissements. 
 
MOTS-CLEFS : capital investissement, capital risque, LBO, gouvernement d’entreprises, conseil 























































The relationships between shareholders, board members, and managers are certainly the most 
frequently studied in the corporate governance literature. The last 20 years have seen the 
progressive adoption by companies in Europe and North America of corporate governance 
methods grounded on postulates issued from organizational economic theories (principally 
agency theory and transaction costs theory). 
 
The main postulates of these methods are two fold: 
 
(i) the main objective of a company is the creation of shareholder value, which is by 
consequence the essence of the mandate given to managers by shareholders.  
(ii) given the opportunism of managers and the information asymmetry between them and 
shareholders, managerial control methods need to be used in order to incite and/or compel 
managers to act in the interest of shareholders. 
 
Hence agency theorists tend to recommend
1 – amongst other features- a strong control by the 
board of top management, reward for performance systems, and equity participation by 
management (either directly or through stock option plans). 
 
It is to be noted, however, that the impact of the above methods on company performance is 
not established by empirical research, which gives mixed and contingent results (see 2.1 
below). 
 
Michael Jensen (1989), an initiator of agency theory, argued that the traditional organisation 
form of the US public company may be replaced, mostly in mature sectors, by other types of 
organisations capable of handling more efficiently the conflicts between shareholders and 
managers. Management Buyouts (MBOs) specialists were mentioned as the main actors of 
this transformation through methods based on high financial leverage, reward for performance 
systems, equity participation for managers and board members (directly or  through stock 
option plans), and contracts aiming at reducing the waste of cash flow.  
 
As regards venture capital
2, numerous academic publications underline the governance 
methods adopted by venture capitalists in the post-investment phase: active participation in 
the board, strict control of management action plans and results, advice to management in 
many areas including strategy formulation, personal support given to management 
(MacMillan & al. 1988, Gorman & Sahlman 1989, Sapienza & Timmons 1989, Rosenstein & 
al. 1993, Fried & Hisrich 1995, Steier & Greenwood 1995). 
 
The methods used by MBO and venture capital firms since the ‘80s have since spread in 
many public and private companies throughout modern economies. An illustration of this 
trend is given by The Economist (August 7, 1999 issue) report on the tremendous rise of stock 
options granted to top managers in the last decade, both in the US and in Europe. 
                                                                 
1 As Donaldson (1990) mentions, agency theory tends to be both of positive and normative nature. 
2 We use in this paper the terminology proposed by the European Venture Capital Association. Private Equity 
refers to equity investment in private companies and covers broadly two areas: Venture Capital, which concerns 
start ups and early stage financing, and MBO’s which generally concern mature companies. The term “venture 
capitalist” (VC) refers, unless otherwise indicated, to professionals being part of either venture capital firms or 






































We believe, therefore, that private equity, as a pioneer industry of many contemporary 
corporate governance methods, constitutes a fascinating field for the study of the relationship 
between managers and board members. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised in three sections. Section one discusses the nature of 
the relationship between board members and managers. Section two presents a review of the 
literature on venture capitalists governance. Section three presents a proposed model of the 
link between VC-CEO social ties and investment financial performance. We conclude the 
paper in the last section. 
 
 
1. The relationship between board members and managers  
1.1. Research on boards of directors: studying demographics or processes? 
 
As mentioned by Forbes and Milliken (1999) a vast majority of the studies concerning boards 
of directors are based on agency theory and, unsurprisingly, focus on such demographic and 
economic characteristics of boards as size, composition (outside directors vs insiders), and 
compensation of board members. We consider this as being a very important limitation of 
existing research on boards in the managerial science literature. Only a very limited number 
of studies consider the way the board actually works, i.e. the processes used and the 
relationships existing between board members (Westphal, 1999).  
 
The links between board demographics and economics on one side, company performance on 
the other are complex and indirect, and the above mentioned limitation may explain why the 
empirical results aiming at putting these links in evidence are so mixed (Charreaux 1997, 
Barkema & Gomez-Mejia 1998, Pochet 1998). 
. 
In other words we believe that, a board being a group of individuals, the performance of the 
work it produces is not only dependant on demographic and economic features, but also on 
group dynamics, involving processes and relationships among members. A field of research, 
infrequently explored, exists here. Exploring this field requires, as a complement to the 
organisational economic theories, the use of social and behavioural theories. This is consistent 
with Eisenhardt (1989) who, taking into account the relative limitation of agency theory 
postulates on human behaviour, encourages scholars to use other theories as complement of 
agency theory,  
 
As an introduction to our research project we describe below two alternative models of 
managers-board members relationship: the independent board model and the cooperative 
board model. 
 
1.2. The independent board model 
 
In this model, based on agency theory, the board’s essential function is to control and monitor 
top management. In this regard the role of independent board members is crucial, particularly 
in public companies with a diffused capital. Independent board members –compared to board 
members dependent on management through personal or professional social ties- are 





































opportunism, and more active in the control of management decisions and of company 
performance (Jensen & Meckling 1976, Charreaux 1997), as depicted below: 
 
 









The independent board model has been tested in numerous empirical studies on public 
companies, with mixed results (Charreaux 1997, Pochet 1998, Westphal 1999). The positive 
relation between board independence and board control efficiency is confirmed in a majority 
of studies, but this is not the case for the relation between board independence and company 
performance.   
 
1.3. The cooperative board model 
 
In this model, as illustrated below, the board is not limited to a controlling and monitoring 
device, but it is also considered as a decision making group, particularly in the field of 
company strategy (Forbes & Milliken, 1999, Westphal, 1999). Board members have a 
consulting and supporting role vis a vis top management, and the existence of an efficient 
cooperation between management and other board members is key to company performance. 
The board is considered as a social structure and the existence of trust and/or social ties 
between board members and managers is believed to foster cooperation between them. 
 
 









This model is consistent with numerous studies which stress the importance of the social 
aspect of business relationships (see for example Larson & Starr, 1993, who propose a model 
of company formation based on the personal social network of the founder). 
 
It is grounded on two families of theories: the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) in which the role of the board in company strategy, and particularly as a 
means of securing key resources, is stressed, and the behavioural and social theories and 
models such as procedural justice theory (Sapienza & Koorsgard, 1996), the prisoner’s 
dilemma model (Cable & Shane, 1997), social exchange theory (Barkema, 1995) and theories 






































Westphal (1999) stresses the importance of social ties (“dependence”) between board 
members and managers, as these tend to foster trust, openness, and cooperation, and hence to 
favour the strategic consulting role of the board. The survey he made on public US companies 
confirms the impact of social ties on the board consulting efficiency and on company 
performance. 
 
1.4. Venture capitalists governance: combining independence and cooperation leads to 
success? 
 
Venture capitalists and MBO specialists (VCs) seem to be able to combine the independent 
and cooperative models. 
 
They can generally be considered as independent board members. The funds which they 
manage hold large  –and often controlling- shareholdings in companies, and they 
consequently have the power to appoint and dismiss top managers. The literature on VC 
governance shows that VCs are in most cases board members, and very active ones (Fried 
et al., 1998, Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). In addition, as mentioned in Sahlman (1990), 
their interest is not confounded with management interest. Their personal employment 
contracts include reward for performance systems generally based on the overall financial 
return of the funds they manage. In their decisions (for example to re-finance a distressed 
investee company), they unsurprisingly tend to favour their relationship with the investors 
who provide them with money rather than their relationship with the managers of a given 
company. 
 
They can also be considered as cooperative board members. The literature (see chapter 2.3 
below) shows the great importance they grant to cooperation with managers, and to their 
own consulting and interpersonal roles, such as being mentors, coaches, sometimes 
friends, vis a vis managers.  
 
This combination of two m odels, which at first sight may seem antagonistic, triggered our 
interest for venture capitalist governance, and, more precisely, for the various aspects of the 
relationship between VCs and managers. Moreover, this suggests an interesting research 
question: Does this ability to combine independence with  trust and  cooperation have an 










































2. Venture capitalists governance: a review of the literature 
 
In this section we first present the three areas of research  which we have identified in the 
literature concerning venture capitalists and MBO specialists governance. We then suggest 
some possible tracks for future research. 
 
The three areas of existing research are the following: 
 
- the roles and value added of VCs: What are the roles of the VCs, in the post-investment 
phase, vis a vis the companies they finance and their managers? Which are the more 
important roles as perceived by VCs and managers? What is the impact of VCs actions, 
especially on company performance? 
 
- the determinants of VCs roles: Do VCs adapt their roles to circumstances and as a function 
of which factors? 
 
- the cooperation between VCs and top management: With which models can the relationship 
between VCs and managers be described? Which factors have an influence on the cooperation 
between them? 
 
2.1. The roles and value-added of venture capitalists 
 
2.1.1. A new typology of roles 
 
MacMillan et al. (1998) and Sapienza & Timmons (1989) have proposed two typologies 
frequently used by other authors. However, they only partially recoup, that is why we propose 
a third, more complete, typology, regrouping VCs roles in three dimensions: 
 
- consulting roles consist of strategic consulting roles (participation to strategy formulation 
and implementation), financial consulting roles (including for example assistance in the 
raising new funds from banks or shareholders), and operational consulting roles (for example 
assistance in the hiring of new people, in  the identification of customers, suppliers, or 
advisors); 
 
- controlling roles consist of the activities that enable VCs to control that managers act in line 
with the agreed upon strategy and the interest of shareholders. They consist of the review of 
plans, budgets, and of actual results, and the control on key decisions such as major 
investments or recruitments.   
 
- interpersonal roles cover the social, and sometimes affective, roles of VCs with managers: 
mentor, coach, confident, provider of emotional and moral support, friend.  
 
 
2.1.2. VCs perception of role importance: consulting roles come first 
 
MacMillan et al. (1988) and Sapienza et al. (1996) have sought to establish a ranking of the 
roles by questioning VCs. Although the typologies used differ, we can draw some general 





































- two roles emerge as being the most important for VCs both as regards their perceived 
involvement and perceived efficiency. They are “consulting roles”: sounding board 
3 and, in 
second place, assistance in obtaining new sources of financing; 
 
- the strategic consulting roles are generally ranked above the operational consulting roles, 
which is consistent with the Fried et al. (1998) findings that VCs are much more involved in 
strategy formulation and evaluation than board members of public companies; 
 
- national specificities seem to exist in the perception of role importance. According to the 
only multi-country study available (Sapienza et al., 1996), French and Dutch VCs seem to 
have a more “financial” profile than their Anglo-American colleagues, granting more 
importance to financial consulting roles and less importance to  sounding board and to 
interpersonal roles; 
 
- the studies available do not permit the direct comparison of the ranking of controlling roles 
and interpersonal roles. 
 
 
2.1.3. Managers and VCs perception of VCs’ roles are broadly consistent  
 
The two US studies available (Sapienza & Timmons, 1989 and Rosenstein et al.,1993) show a 
great proximity between managers and VC perceptions. However two differences are shown 
by Rosenstein et al.: 
 
-first, managers give lower rankings than VCs to the strategic consulting roles. It therefore 
seems that VCs have a higher perception of their contribution to strategy than managers have.  
- secondly, managers give a much higher importance (compared to VCs) to the role VCs have 
in assisting the company in its interactions with other equity investors (interfacing with 
investors group).   
 
 
2.1.4. The value added by VCs: mixed evidence 
 
Do VCs add value to the companies in which they invest? The literature gives mixed results 
and shows that value added is dependent on various factors. 
 
A first way to attempt to answer this question is to study the link between the level of VC 
involvement in monitoring companies and the performance of these companies. MacMillan et 
al. (1988) fail to establish a relation: the performance of companies monitored by “laissez 
faire” VCs is not significantly different from that of companies monitored by VCs with a high 
degree of involvement. 
 
Another way is to ask for the opinion of managers. Rosenstein et al. (1993) show that 
managers do not consider that VCs have a higher contribution than non VC external board 
members, except for VCs belonging to the top US VC firms. Moreover, the opinion of 
managers on VC’s contribution is not correlated to company performance, which is also the 
case in Barney et al. (1996).   
                                                                 
3 One can note that the sounding board role, described by Sapienza et al. (1996) as “Listens, responds 





































Sapienza (1992) gives more positive conclusions on the value added by VCs, establishing a 
positive relation between VC’s value added (as perceived by both managers and VCs) and, 
respectively, company performance, and the frequency and openness of VC-managers 
interactions.  
 
All the above studies use a similar methodology (mail questionnaires). The mixed results may 
be partly caused by differences in the samples (for example Rosenstein & al. have questioned 
CEOs of high tech firms only whereas all sectors were included in the other studies), and in 
the operationalization of variables (for example the measure of performance is  based on 
perception in MacMillan & al., in Rosenstein & al. and in Sapienza whereas it is based on 
accounting measures in Barney & al.).      
 
2.2. Adaptation to risk: the determinants of venture capitalists roles 
 
Some authors have tested the links existing between VCs roles and behaviour, and the 
characteristics of the companies and of the managers they monitor, especially as regards two 
kinds of potential risks: agency risks (risks of opportunistic behaviour of managers which may 
be adverse to shareholders interest), and business risks (risks linked to the nature of the 
company: industry, stage of financing, managers experience level,…).  
 
These studies are based on the general hypothesis that VCs are conscious of these risks and 
try to adapt their behaviour in consequence. The results do not clearly confirm this 
assumption: when risk level is high, VCs tend to use contracts enabling a stronger control on 
management (Barney et al., 1989), to reinforce their presence on the board (Lerner, 1995), 
and to increase the frequency of interaction with managers (Sapienza & Gupta, 1994, 
Sapienza et al., 1996). But it is to be noted that the correlation coefficients are often low, and 
that some results do not show evidence of the expected links between risk and VC behaviour.  
 
2.3. The necessary cooperation between venture capitalists and managers 
 
In these studies cooperation is generally considered to be fostered by (1) agreed upon and 
respected information exchange procedures, (2) open and trustful interpersonal relationships. 
 
Sapienza & Koorsgard (1996), using procedural justice theory, show the relation existing 
between the level of VC satisfaction with the information procedures used by companies and 
the level of trust and support they accord to managers. An interesting and paradoxical 
conclusion of their work is that managers can gain more freedom by simply fulfilling the 
information needs of their shareholders.   
 
Using the prisoner’s dilemma metaphor, Cable & Shane (1997) propose a model 
incorporating the main  factors which can impact on the decision of VCs and managers to 
cooperate (on the prisoner’s dilemma metaphor, see also Axelrod, 1992). The factors are: 
 
personal similarity: prisoner’s dilemma research has shown that cooperation is favoured if 





































0  10 
information exchange: cooperation is enhanced when information about the cooperative 
strategy of one party can be gathered easily by the other. Two factors that affect 
information transfer are communication and social relationships between the parties. 
 
time pressure: the greater the time pressure to reach an agreement, the more likely parties 
are to reach a cooperative solution. Time is a component of financial returns, and is 
therefore important for VCs. In addition VCs have commitments towards their investors to 
invest and divest the funds they manage within a limited period of time. 
  
payoff to cooperation: cooperation can be enhanced by increasing payoffs from 
cooperation. Most VC transactions occur because both parties are expecting high potential 
gains from cooperation. 
 
transaction procedures: Prisoner’s dilemma research has established that certain 
procedures can be implemented to increase the probability of cooperation, particularly in 
the early stages of the relation, when the parties generally do know and do not trust each 
other. Example s of such procedures in VC are non-compete clauses or antidilution 
clauses granted by management,  
 
 
The high importance granted by VCs to social ties and mutual trust with managers is 
underlined by many authors, as illustrated by the following statements: 
 
Fried & Hisrich, 1995 (p.106): 
(quote of a VC interviewed) 
 
« It’s really the personal relationship that you develop with the guy running the 
company and his team and other directors. [You have influence] if they conclude that 
you are an interesting person committed to the success of the company, that you’re 
going to work hard at it, that you’re not going to try to run it, that you’re going to be 
very open, and that you think clearly and communicate clearly and are just a valuable 
person to have around.” 
  
Sapienza et al.,1994 (p.15):  
 
« The fact that interpersonal involvement is accorded more importance than 
operational involvement […] is particularly fascinating. It suggests that functions 
such as energizing and motivating management, sharing psychological risk and 
trauma, and being a friend and confidant end up being more important than providing 
a network of contacts, a benefit so often mentioned by venture capital firms attempting 
to attract business. The apparent level of trust which must develop to make this 
succeed belies a now old image of venture capitalists as “vulture capitalists” 
 
Steier & Greenwood, 1995 (p.351): 
 
“One venture capitalist flippantly described the value of the unique emotional support 
he was able to provide: ”Who can an entrepreneur talk to about his problems? He 
can’t talk to his wife – she’ll leave. He can’t talk to his employees – they’ll quit”. […] 
In many ways, supportive venture capitalists can provide the emotional as well as 




































0  11 
The “cooperative board” model, as described in paragraph 1.3 is particularly well illustrated 
by these statements. Dimensions such as cooperation, trust, and personal support, seem to be 
key in the relationship between managers and VCs. This confirms our view that considering 
the board of directors only as a controlling and monitoring device (as illustrated by the 
“independent board” model), which is the case of the vast majority of corporate governance 
literature on boards, is incomplete and misleading.  
 
2.4. Suggested research areas  
 
The review of literature , in the previous sections, shows that the knowledge on VC 
governance is still incomplete in many areas, and that there are many interesting tracks for 
future research. In what follows, we propose four possible research areas.   
 
Proposing and testing a comprehensive typology of VC’s roles 
 
partial and do not permit a comparative ranking of the importance granted by VCs and by 
managers to controlling roles and to interpersonal roles. 
 
 
Enriching knowledge on country specific governance methods 
 
In the only international comparative study on VC’s governance available, Sapienza et al. 
(1996) mention the specificities of French and Dutch VCs. One may think that, with the 
progressive internationalisation of the private equity industry, mostly under the domination of 
Anglo-American firms, these specificities will fade out. However, further research may help 
to validate, detail, and explain these specificities. 
 
 
Enriching knowledge on VCs’ value added and its determinants 
 
The relations between VCs’ value added and their level of involvement, on one hand, and 
company performance, on the other hand, appear to be not consistently established by 
empirical research. Moreover these studies have only been conducted on US companies. A 
research field exists here, particularly in countries other than the US.  
 
Exploring the role of trust and social ties in VCs-managers relationship  
 
Trust 
We mentioned above the importance granted to trust by VCs. Trust has been an area of 
considerable interest in managerial science in recent years, particularly in marketing (see the 
review of literature by Guibert, 1999) and in organization science (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). 
The role of trust has been studied in various non hierarchical relationships (Burt & Knez, 
1996, Shepard & Tuchinski, 1996), but not, as far as we know, in CEO-board relationship. 
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on the cognitive side, the presence of trust may enhance the openness of communication, 
which could benefit both management (who can derive more value added from board 
advice) and other board members (whose controlling role is made easier); 
 
on the interpersonal side: trust may favour the interpersonal roles of board members vis a 
vis managers. 
 
Trust may be expected, thus, to have a positive impact on performance. But we also know that 
an overinvestment in trust (“blind” trust) can be dangerous and favour opportunistic 
behaviour. Therefore, building on Wicks et al. (1999) “optimal trust” model, further research 
could examine whether VCs adapt their investment in trust to circumstances (business risks, 
agency risks, level of dependence vis à vis management,…) and could help to establish 
whether the level of trust has an impact on investment performance.  
 
Social ties 
As mentioned above (1.2 and 1.3) VC-CEO social ties can be expected to have a n egative 
impact on performance, according to the independent board model, or a positive one 
according to the cooperative board model. 
 
The literature suggests that the impact of social ties on performance mediates through VC-
CEO processes (for example information exchange procedures) and through VCs roles vis à 
vis CEOs (for example the level of controlling or consulting roles). Therefore, a model 
formalising the influence of social ties on investment performance through processes and 
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3. Proposal of a model linking VC-CEO social ties and investment 
performance 
 
We think that a distinctive feature of private equity specialists is their ability to combine, as 
board members, the independent and cooperative models described above in part 1. In an 
attempt to help understand how this combination works and what are its consequences, we 
propose the model described below.   
 
This model constitutes an attempt to formalise the influence of social ties between VCs and 
CEOs on the processes which characterise their relationship, on the roles that VCs play vis a 
vis CEOs, and, through processes and roles, on investment performance. 
 



























































































0  14 




We consider in the model social ties between VCs and CEOs as the independent variable. 
Based on the theoretical background and review of literature exposed above, our proposal is 
that VC-CEO social ties have an influence on investment performance through two types of 
mediating variables: 
 
a-the processes between VCs and CEOs, particularly as the board is concerned. Building on 
the literature on boards and on VC-CEO relationship, we have identified 5 process variables 
(see Sapienza & Koorsgard, 1996, Cable & Shane, 1997, Forbes & Milliken,1999): 
 
frequency of contacts between VCs and CEOs, 
 
quality of information transmission procedures: are VCs and CEOs satisfied with the way 
they exchange information (for example VCs are often dissatisfied with the timeliness and 
content of the reporting made by investee companies), 
 
effort norms, which refer to the group’s shared beliefs regarding the level of effort each 
individual is expected to put forward a task, 
 
cognitive conflicts, which consist of task-oriented differences in judgement among group 
members about the content of a task or the way to handle it, 
 
use of board member skills, which refers to the board’s ability to use the knowledge and  
skills of its members and to apply them to its tasks. 
 
 
b-the roles of VCs vis a vis CEOs. Our review of literature on VCs governance leads to the 
identification of three types of roles (see 2.1.1 above): 
 
- consulting roles consist of strategic consulting roles (participation to strategy formulation 
and implementation), financial consulting roles (including for example assistance in the 
raising new funds from banks or shareholders), and operational consulting roles (for example 
assistance in the hiring of new people, in the identification of customers, suppliers, or 
advisors); 
 
- controlling roles consist of the activities that enable VCs to control that managers act in line 
with the agreed upon strategy and the interest of shareholders. They consist of the review of 
plans, budgets, and of actual results, and the control on key decisions such as major 
investments or recruitments.   
 
- interpersonal roles cover the social, and sometimes affective, roles of VCs with managers: 
mentor, coach, confident, provider of emotional and moral support, friend.  
 
 
The dependent variable is investment performance, i.e. the absolute (or relative to plan) 
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Control variables: as investment performance is obviously dependent on many different 
factors, a number of control variables need to be m easured. They include data on private 
equity firms (size, type, country of origin), VCs (age, country of origin, previous experience, 
reward system), CEOs (age, country of origin, previous experience, reward system), VC-CEO 
previous social ties, portfolio companies (size, industry, technological intensity, agency risk, 
business risk, financial risk), deal characteristics (size, date of execution, equity structure, 
board composition).    
 
The main hypotheses underlying the model are detailed below. 
 
 
3.2.2. Links between social ties and processes 
 
H1a  Strong social ties are positively associated with the frequency of interaction 
One can assume that individuals linked by strong social ties will meet more frequently, and 
that shared experience and frequent contacts may help to develop trust and social ties inside 
an organisation (Powell, 1996). 
 
H1b  Strong social ties are negatively associated with the frequency of interaction 
Agency theory suggests that independent board members, aiming at exerting an intense 
control on managers, tend to meet them more often than “dependent” board members 
(Charreaux, 1997). As shown in the literature, VCs tend to adapt their behaviour to the risk 
they perceive, by meeting managers more often when risk  increases (Sapienza & Amazon, 
1993, Sapienza & Gupta, 1994). 
 
H2  Strong social ties are positively associated with satisfaction with information 
exchange procedures 
The mutual trust associated with strong social ties may encourage CEOs to be more open as 
regards information exchange (Westphal, 1999), and consequently to follow the agreed upon 
procedures as regards board information timing and content. The fact that VCs are satisfied 
with the information procedures can, in addition, increase their trust in the CEO (Sapienza & 
Koorsgard, 1996).  
 
H3  Strong social ties are negatively associated with cognitive conflicts 
Forbes & Milliken (1999) show that the existence of cognitive conflicts inside the board 
can increase the board efficiency in strategic decision making, by encouraging the review and 
assessment of various possible actions. But they mention that cognitive conflicts may have a 
negative impact on board cohesion and on board members satisfaction. 
Therefore, we can expect that the existence of strong social ties may encourage b oard 
members to reduce the frequency and the intensity of cognitive conflicts, in order to preserve 
the quality of their relationship with the CEO, whereas independent board members may be 
less reluctant to provoke cognitive conflicts if they consider it necessary.    
 
H4a  Strong social ties are positively associated with board effort level 
Strong social ties are believed to encourage, through mutual trust and openness, an active 
cooperation between board members and CEOs, particularly as strategic decisions are 
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H4b  Strong social ties are negatively associated with board effort level 
Agency theory suggests that independent board members will tend to be more active and 
more involved in the board tasks (particularly as monitoring and control are concerned) than 
dependent ones (Charreaux, 1997). 
 
H5  Strong social ties are positively associated with an efficient use of board member skills 
and talents 
The ability of a group to cooperate and to learn collectively , which we may assume to be 
favoured by the existence of strong social ties between members, has a positive impact on the 
expression and use of the skills and talents of its members (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). 
 
 
3.2.3. Links between social ties and VC roles 
 
H6  Strong social ties are negatively associated with the controlling roles of VCs 
This is a fundamental hypothesis of agency theorists. As Charreaux wrote: « …the efficiency 
of the control  from the board [on top management]  is supposed to lie upon the mutual 
oversight by managers one hand, and on the presence of external board members (non 
affiliated with management) on the other hand» (Charreaux, 1997, p.150)
4. 
 
H7  Strong social ties are positively associated with the consulting roles of VCs 
This hypothesis is largely developed and empirically confirmed by Westphal (1999): strong 
social ties foster the cooperation between board members and CEOs and demand by CEOs of 
advice from board members. 
 
H8  Strong social ties are positively associated with the interpersonal roles of VCs 
We can assume that roles such as mentor, coach, confident (and, evidently, friend) may be 
favoured by the existence of strong social ties. These ties are expected to contribute to the 
establishment of the mutual knowledge and trust that may favour interpersonal roles. 
 
H9  Controlling roles are negatively associated with consulting and interpersonal roles  
Using social exchange theory, Barkema (1995) shows that, when principal and agent are 
characterised by frequent contacts, which is generally the case between VCs and CEOs, a 
high level of control by the principal on the agent may be counter productive. If control is 
excessive, the agent may consider that the social exchange contact which links him to the 
principal is broken, and, therefore, may reduce his effort level and his openness to 
cooperation. We may also expect that a high level of control by VCs is incompatible with the 
development of interpersonal roles.   
 
                                                                 
4 The original French text is: « …l’efficacité du contrôle du conseil d’administration [sur les principaux 
dirigeants] est censée reposer d’une part, sur la surveillance mutuelle entre dirigeants présents au conseil, et 
d’autre part, sur la présence d’administrateurs externes (non affiliés au management) ». English translation by  
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3.2.4. Links between processes and investment performance 
 
H10  The frequency of interaction is positively associated with performance 
 
This hypotheses is cautiously proposed, as the literature shows mixed evidence on this 
association (see2.1.4). Contrary to expectations derived from agency theory, Mac Millan et al. 
(1988) failed to establish a link between monitoring intensity by VCs and performance. 
An explanation of these findings may lie with causality: if one can expect that a high 
monitoring level has a positive effect on performance, one can also suspect that  increased 
risks and difficulties (which may produce, “in fine”, lower performance) met by investee 
companies tend to encourage VCs to increase their monitoring level (Barney & al., 1994). 
 
H11  The quality of information exchange is positively associated with performance 
We can assume that the board will be able to produce a better work, and particularly to take 
better strategic decisions, if board members are correctly informed on the company and on its 
environment by management.  
 
Hypotheses 12, 13, and 14 are derived from group dynamics and board efficiency literature 
(Guzzo & Shea, 1992, Forbes & Milliken, 1999). They are: 
 
H12  Cognitive conflicts are positively associated with performance 
Cognitive conflicts between the members of  the board are expected to contribute to the 
quality of strategic decision making, because they result in the consideration and careful 
evaluation of different alternatives before any decision is taken. In addition, the presence of 
disagreement in the board require CEOs to explain, and sometimes modify his proposals. 
 
H13  High effort norms are positively associated with performance 
If high effort norms prevail in the board, one can expect that board meetings will be regularly 
attended and well prepared by members, which should lead to better quality meetings and to 
better decisions. 
  
H14  The use of board members’ knowledge and skills    is positively associated with 
performance 
One may expect that better collective decisions will be reached if each member brings on the 
table his specific knowledge and skills, in a cooperative way, within the board, when various 
alternatives are exposed and debated. 
 
 
3.2.5. Links between VC roles and investment performance 
 
H15  VC controlling roles are positively associated with performance 
Agency theorists have largely developed, and empirically tested, the hypothesis that a high 
level of monitoring by board members has a positive impact on company performance (see 
Fama & Jensen, 1983, Charreaux, 1997). The rationale behind this hypothesis is that 
independent board members are supposed to exert a stronger oversight and monitoring on 
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H16  VC consulting roles are positively associated with performance 
Many authors in the organisational and corporate governance literature have underlined the 
value of the advice which board members give to managers, particularly as regards the 
information and control of the corporate environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), and the 
strategy formulation (see Westphal, 1999, and his review of literature on the “cooperative 
board” model).  
 
H17  VC interpersonal roles are positively associated with performance 
The importance that VCs and managers grant to these roles clearly appears in VC governance 
literature (Sapienza & al., 1994, Steier & Greenwood, 1995). For example Sapienza & al. 
(p.15) mention the importance for VCs of “…functions such as energizing and motivating 
management, sharing psychological risk and trauma, and being a friend and confident…”. 
We would expect that they grant importance to these roles because they think they are key to 
performance. Our personal experience in private equity showed us that support from board 





Building on the existing literature, we propose to complement the agency theory perspective, 
which is largely dominant in corporate governance research, by social and behavioural 
theories, which have the merit of shedding light on the way the board actually works as a 
group composed of individuals who have tasks to meet, and who establish processes and 
interpersonal relationships between them. 
 
We propose to apply our approach to the case of private equity, as private equity specialists 
seem to have been the pioneers of some very successful governance methods, and as they 
seem to be able to successfully combine independence and cooperation with CEOs. 
    
An important limit of our model may lie in the causality issue. Both on a theoretical and 
intuitive basis, many associations between the model variables can be doubled sided (for 
example strong social ties are expected to favour a high frequency of interaction, but a high 
frequency of interaction may be expected to favour the emergence of trust and of strong social 
ties). We need to assess further the theoretical and practical consequences of this issue. 
 
Trust (i.e. interpersonal trust between VC and CEO) is indirectly present in the model as it 
underlies many of the hypotheses. However, trust does not appear explicitly as a variable. We 
need to consider more deeply if and how trust could be incorporated in the model, or if 
another model could be built using trust as the independent variable.   
   
The future research that we intend to pursue is the empirical test of the model. We propose to 
operationalize the model variables and to measure them through a questionnaire to French 
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APPENDIX 
 




Do social ties between VCs and managers influence: 
 
-the processes of their relationship, particularly as the board is concerned: frequency of 
contacts, information transmission procedures, effort norms, cognitive conflicts, use of board 
members skills; 
 
-the roles of VCs vis a vis managers: compared importance of controlling, consulting and 
interpersonal roles; 
 
-via processes and roles, the performance of VC’s investments in companies? 




Agency theory, in which the board a ppears essentially as a control device, particularly 
through the action of independent board members. 
 
Resource dependence theory, which underlines the role of the board in company strategy, 
particularly as a mean of securing key resources. 
 
Social and behavioural theories and models (procedural justice, prisoner’s dilemma, theories 
of trust, social exchange theory) which can help to study the board processes, the behaviours 






Test of an original model formalising the relations between VCs-management social ties, 
processes, VC’s roles, and investment performance.  
 
 
Operationalisation of variables 
 
Investment performance (explained variable):   -absolute and/or relative (to initial plan) 
IRRs 
 
              -VCs and CEOs perception 
 
Processes, VC’s roles (mediating variables):  -questions to VCs and CEOs 
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A number of control variables will also be gathered through the questionnaire and using 





Questionnaire of VC-CEO dyads, members of the board of the same company.  
 




Data analysis methods 
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